The Significance of the Washington Conference of 1921 1922. The Washington Conference (1921-1922). Interstate contradictions in the Far East

The aim of the conference was the limitation of naval armaments, the problem of the Far East and the Pacific Ocean basin.

The conference was held from November 1921 to February 1922 in the US capital, Washington.

It was attended by: USA, UK, China, Japan, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal. Germany, deprived of all possession in the Pacific Ocean by the Treaty of Versailles, and Russia - "in the absence of a single government" - were not invited to the conference. However, the delegation of the Far Eastern Republic arrived in Washington without an invitation and conducted negotiations there outside the framework of the official agenda with representatives of the United States and other powers, seeking mainly a decision on the withdrawal of Japanese troops from its territory.

In total, seven contracts and two additional agreements were signed.

The USA, Great Britain, France and Japan signed a "four-power treaty" for a period of 10 years on the inviolability of island possessions and territories in the Pacific Ocean. They pledged to respect the status quo with respect to their Pacific islands and to enter into negotiations with each other in the event of a danger to their rights and interests in the region from a country not a party to the treaty, in order to take appropriate measures for each of the parties alone or together with everyone.

The "Treaty of the Four Powers" canceled the military-political alliance between Great Britain and Japan, concluded in 1911. This was done in order not to provoke mistrust between the great powers. This decision, made under pressure from Washington, was received ambiguously in different countries. Many believed that the existence of an alliance with Japan provided the West with a tool to influence Tokyo's policy and could prevent Japan from becoming an expansionist power. At the same time, the created multilateral framework for international regulation, in principle, created a more reliable basis for stabilizing the situation in the region.

On February 6, 1922, the nine powers — China, the United States, the British Empire, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Portugal — signed a treaty on the principles of policy in the Chinese question ("the nine-power treaty"). It guaranteed the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of China, obliging the participants to refrain from using the difficult situation in China to obtain special rights and privileges. All nine countries also signed a treaty providing joint regulation of Chinese tariffs and "equal opportunities" in the country in the field of trade and business. The powers also agreed to respect China's rights as a neutral state in the event of a war in which China does not participate.

Under a separate treaty dated February 4, 1922, Japan returned to China sovereignty over the Shandong Peninsula (transferred to it at Versailles in 1919), as well as the Qingdao-Jinan railway and the Jiaozhou territory. The head of the Japanese delegation also pledged that the Japanese government would not demand that the Chinese government fulfill the fifth group of Japan's "Twenty-One Demands". (Japan's "Twenty-One Demands" are demands made by Japan to China on January 18, 1915 in order to establish Japanese domination in China, both political and economic. They consisted of 5 groups:

The 1st group demanded that China unconditionally recognize all the conditions that Japan will agree on in the future at a peace conference with Germany on the issue of German territory in Shandong, which was leased there by the Germans and captured by the Japanese in 1914;

Group 2 provided for the extension of the lease term for Lushun (Port Arthur), Dalian (Dalniy) and the South Manchurian Railway by Japan to 99 years;

Group 3 envisaged the transformation of the Han'epa Metallurgical Plant into a mixed Japanese-Chinese enterprise;

Group 4 obliged China not to provide harbors, bays or islands to any third power;

Group 5 contained the general political demands of Japan: about the invitation by China of Japanese advisers, the creation of a unified Japanese-Chinese police in the most important cities, new Japanese railway concessions in China, etc.)

On February 6, 1922, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan signed the Five Powers Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Arms. The path to its conclusion was opened by London's consent to the US proposal to abandon the "two powers standard", in accordance with which Great Britain tried to maintain the total tonnage of its naval displacement at the level of the fleets of any two other great powers, together taken. The new plan, presented by the United States, provided for the establishment of a fairly high level of naval weapons for Japan, although the quota for it was lower than for the United States and Britain.

The agreement established the proportion of the maximum tonnage of the liner fleet of its participants: USA -5, Great Britain -5, Japan -3, France -1.75, Italy -1.75.

The agreement limited the size of ships to be laid down in the future. None of the powers should have acquired or built liner ships with a displacement of more than 35 thousand tons. The United States insisted on this, since the Panama Canal could not pass warships of larger tonnage, and it was extremely important for the United States to be able to freely transfer its fleet from Atlantic Ocean to Pacific Ocean and back. The total tonnage of battleships was not to exceed:

For the USA and Great Britain 525 thousand tons, - for Japan 315 thousand tons,

For Italy and France 175 thousand tons.

The tonnage of aircraft carriers was also installed: - for the USA and Great Britain 135 thousand tons, - for Japan 81 thousand tons,

For Italy and France 60 thousand tons.

However, the total tonnage of the navies of the powers was not limited, which actually retained the superiority of the British fleet. The United States, Britain and Japan agreed to maintain the status quo on coastal fortifications and naval bases. They abandoned additional military construction at all points in the region, with the exception of a number of specified areas:

The United States was allowed to continue building fortifications in the area adjacent to its coast, off the coast of Alaska, in the Panama Canal and Hawaii. The United States abandoned attempts to fortify the Aleutian Islands, from which it could threaten Japan;

Great Britain retained the right to engage in strengthening its positions in the island possessions adjacent to the coast of Canada, Australia with adjacent territories and New Zealand, but refused to expand bases in Hong Kong and in the island possessions east of 110 meridian east longitude;

Japan pledged not to build up arms on the Kuril Islands, Bonin Islands, Amama Oshima, Lushu (Lushu), Formosa (Taiwan) and Pescadores.

A ten-year moratorium on new shipbuilding was also established and the number of naval bases in the Pacific was frozen.

The reasons for the instability of the Versailles-Washington peace system

Several reasons can be identified that made the post-war peace settlement system unstable and ineffective.

1. The Versailles Order was not all-encompassing. First of all, the USSR and the USA, two major powers, "dropped out" from it, without which it was already impossible to ensure stability in Europe in the twentieth century. In fact, the multipolar structure of European relations was restored in the spirit of the European equilibrium of the 19th century, when the ideal option seemed to be the absence on the continent of countries that would too clearly break ahead in their geopolitical and other possibilities.

It was these ideas that led to the fact that France's efforts to weaken Germany as much as possible were crowned with success: it was divided into parts, artificially reduced in size and placed in an extremely difficult economic situation. But for this reason, France itself, through the efforts of Britain, did not gain predominance in Europe and was unable to fully implement the plans to expand its influence.

But such a European equilibrium was only possible with the participation of Prussia (which was now replaced by a united Germany) and Russia. The new European security was to be built, firstly, in the conditions of a united Germany, and, secondly, in the conditions of reduced in size and isolated from European affairs, Russia.

Unfortunately, only the first of these new circumstances was taken into account, which resulted in the fragmentation of Germany, which made it possible to postpone the conflict between the interests of the largest European countries and the natural desire of the Germans to unite. The second, at first, was not taken into account at all - at that moment it seemed that US participation in European affairs was sufficient compensation for Russia's withdrawal from European politics. In this situation, the frustration of hopes for cooperation with the United States undermined the foundations of the Versailles Order as it was originally conceived.

2. The fundamental weakness of Versailles was the scheme of economic interaction between European countries laid down by him. The fact is that the new state delimitation completely destroyed economic ties in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead of a single market, permeable and fairly open, Europe turned out to be a territory divided into several dozen small markets fenced off from each other by customs walls. Often the new small states fiercely competed not only in the political, but also in the economic sphere, fully concentrating on their own economic difficulties and not trying to make joint efforts to overcome them.

The proclaimed principle of self-determination of nations gave rise to an economic split, which European countries could not overcome. This created a permanent instability of the economic situation in the Old World. Europe turned out to be not ready to take joint decisions on financial and economic issues. In addition, the economic ruin of Germany, crushed by the weight of reparation payments imposed on it and unable, therefore, to get out of the depression with the speed necessary for economic recovery not only in the country, but throughout Europe, had a decisive impact on the negative development of the situation.

The world economic crisis of 1929-1933 led to a sharp deterioration in relations both between the victor countries and between them and the defeated states, etc. All this, coupled with the intra-national crisis of most states, led to the collapse of the Versailles-Washington system and to the Second World War.

Consequences of the Versailles Treaty

· Germany and Soviet Russia were affected, which caused a mutually beneficial rapprochement between the two countries. Germany built military equipment prohibited by the treaty on the territory of the USSR and trained its armed forces. The Soviet Union received official recognition of the status of an important European country (1922), as a result of which the Entente countries were also forced to recognize it, otherwise Germany had a privileged position in trade with Russia.

· Both the USSR and Germany considered the Versailles Peace Treaty unjust. The Entente countries disclaimed all responsibility for the world war, although in reality it was a common European tragedy, and the blame for it lay on all the parties involved.

· Too large amount of reparations collected from Germany led to inflation and impoverishment of large masses of the population. We can say that thanks to the Versailles Treaty, the regime of Adolf Hitler emerged, who put forward the popular slogans of revenge.

· The League of Nations, the first working meeting of which took place on January 16, 1920 in Geneva, was led by the Entente. Failing to limit the French aggression against Germany (the occupation of the Ruhr region in 1923), the League of Nations lost its credibility and the ability to intervene in the more serious conflicts of the 1930s and prevent World War II.

In modern Russian historiography, as a rule, the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty are considered extremely humiliating and cruel in relation to Germany. It is believed that this is what led to extreme social instability within the country, the emergence of ultra-right forces and the rise to power of the Nazis. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the severe restrictions imposed on Germany were not properly controlled by the European powers (or their violations were deliberately left Germany's hands). The desire of the European powers to use the Hitler regime to fight the USSR is often cited as an argument in favor of the latter. This also explains the Munich agreement, according to which the leading European countries allowed Nazi Germany the Anschluss of Czechoslovakia, which they promised support yesterday.



This book examines events associated with two opposing trends in international politics in the 1920s and 1930s.

The essence of the first is that after the Great War of 1914-1918. the governments of the Entente countries seriously dreamed of a Great Peace. Having emerged victorious from the monstrous slaughter, disarming their former opponents, they believed that in the future they would be able to resolve disputes among themselves through negotiations. Therefore, they created the League of Nations, agreed to serious quantitative and qualitative restrictions on their land, air and naval forces.

The essence of the second tendency was that, contrary to the good intentions of the leadership of the great powers, over thirty military conflicts and local wars had taken place in the world in twenty years. The building of the international world order was persistently set on fire from different directions. In the end, the fire broke out of a new worldwide massacre, even larger and more brutal than the first.

Both of these trends are discussed in detail in this book on the material of facts related to the development and use of the navies of the great and minor naval powers.

Sections of this page:

On July 10, 1921, US Secretary of State (i.e., Foreign Secretary) Charles Evans Hughes proposed convening a nine-nation conference. First, countries with access to the Pacific Ocean - the United States, Japan and China - were supposed to participate in it. Secondly, the countries that had colonies in this region - Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal (plus the USA and Japan). Thirdly, the countries that had concessions in China - Belgium and Italy (plus the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France).

Soviet Russia did not receive an invitation on the grounds that it lost access to the Pacific Ocean in connection with the formation of the so-called Far Eastern Republic - the Far Eastern Republic. However, representatives of the FER who arrived in Washington were also not allowed to participate in the conference due to the fact that the FER government is a puppet entirely dependent on Moscow. In response, the government of the RSFSR protested to the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and China, stressing that it would not consider a single decision taken at the conference to be binding on itself.

The conference was supposed to discuss two main issues: limitation of naval arms and settlement of the situation in the Far East. After a stage of preliminary negotiations, it began its meetings on November 12, 1921, in Washington, under the chairmanship of C.E. Hughes.

As a result of the conference, three agreements were signed, which became a victory for American diplomacy. The United States has succeeded in slowing down Japanese expansion in the Pacific and in China, as well as establishing parity with the British fleet, without resorting to an expensive arms race.

The first of these treaties (the treaty of four states) was signed on December 13, 1921 by the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France for a period of 10 years. The parties pledged to respect the rights of each of the states parties to the treaty and guaranteed the safety of their possessions in the Pacific Islands (that is, they divided spheres of influence). After its ratification, the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902 (extended in 1911), which stipulated the interests of both countries in this region, became invalid, which facilitated American economic expansion in the Far East.

The second treaty (treaty of nine states) was signed on February 6, 1922 by representatives of the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, China and Portugal. He referred to the policy of these states towards China. The parties to the treaty pledged to respect China's sovereignty, independence and administrative-territorial integrity. As a result, Japan had to return to China the Shandong Peninsula, which it seized in 1914-1915. together with the German naval base Qingdao. The return took place before the end of 1922. At the same time, the treaty obliged China to continue to pursue an open-door policy, "which, first of all, played into the hands of the Americans.

***

The third treaty dealt with naval weapons. Here, the starting position of the United States was clear enough. The navies of Austria-Hungary and Turkey were eliminated, and the German and Russian (Soviet) fleets were reduced to a safe minimum. It remains to agree only to the other five "great maritime powers."

This treaty, also known as the "five-state treaty" (USA, UK, Japan, France, Italy), was adopted after a long period of controversy. US Secretary of State Hughes said that when negotiating disarmament, the already existing potential of the fleets of the great maritime powers should be taken as a starting point. Moreover, a comparison of these potentials must be made in terms of the total displacement of battleships and battle cruisers, that is, the so-called "capital ships". The tonnage of the remaining combat units should be summed up and recalculated by the number of conventional battleships or battle cruisers of the corresponding displacement.

The most important point of the arms limitation plan proposed by Hughes was the proclamation of a kind of "vacation in the construction of battleships" for a period of at least 10 years.

The United States, which was implementing the 1916 plan, had at that time 10 battleships and 6 battle cruisers in various stages of construction. Moreover, one battleship was almost completely built, the readiness of another 2 was 80%, and the remaining 7 battleships were on the stocks.

According to Hughes' proposal, all 9 unfinished battleships and 6 battle cruisers should have been scrapped, which gave a total of 15 ships with a total displacement of 618,000 tons (the tonnage of ships indicated by Hughes differed from the real one within 6-7%). In addition, he proposed dismantling 15 old American battleships for metal, with the exception of Delaware and South Dacota, which added 15 more ships with a total displacement of 227,000 tons, and only 30 ships and 845,700 tons.

Great Britain was proposed to abandon the construction of 4 battle cruisers according to the 1921 project (172,000 tons), scrapping all dreadnought battleships, as well as dreadnoughts built before the series of ships of the "King George V" class - this was 19 units. A total of 23 ships with a total displacement of 583.375 tons.

Japan was offered to abandon the planned construction of 8 battleships and battle cruisers, to disassemble 3 battleships - "Mutsu" (95% ready), "Tosa" and "Kaga" (launched), as well as 4 battle cruisers - "Amagi" and " Akagi "(launched)," Atago "and" Takao "(on the stocks). In total, the Japanese were asked to send for scrap 7 unfinished ships with a total displacement of 289,100 tons. In addition, they should have destroyed all pre-dreadnoughts - 10 units (159.828 tons). In total, 17 ships with a total displacement of 448.928 tons were to be scrapped.

Thus, the three great maritime powers abandoned 70 large warships with a total displacement of 1,878,000 tons. Struck by the scale of such a "pogrom", a correspondent for the London Times wrote in his report: "Secretary of State Hughes sank more ships of the line in 35 minutes than all the admirals in the world over the centuries!"

Three months after the signing of the treaty, the number of ships of this class remaining in service would be as follows: 1) USA - 18 battleships, 500,650 British tons; 2) Great Britain - 18 battleships and 4 battle cruisers, 604,450 tons; 3) Japan - 6 battleships and 4 battle cruisers, 299,700 tons.

At the same time, Hughes proposed setting the maximum permissible total tonnage of battleships for the United States and Great Britain at 500,000 tons, for Japan - 300,000 tons, for France and Italy - 175,000 tons each.

It is necessary to explain where these numbers came from. According to the provisions adopted at the conference, each fleet was to consist of two groups of ships: linear and light, while the ratio between the groups was determined as 1: 1.

The total tonnage of the British fleet was established on the basis of the mathematical equality of the total tonnage of the fleets of the three largest European countries in 1921: France (575,000 tons), Italy (345,000 tons) and Germany (108,000 tons) - only 1,028,000 tons, after rounding 1,000,000 tons.

The same tonnage limit was envisaged for the American fleet. Taking into account the proportion between the groups within the fleets - 1: 1, we get 500,000 tons of battleships for each of the two Anglo-Saxon countries. The figures for the French and Italian fleets were calculated in a similar way. From the mathematical equality mentioned above, it followed that the tonnage of each of them should not exceed 1/3 of the tonnage of the British fleet, that is, 333.333 tons for each country, after rounding off - 350,000 tons, of which the battleships accounted for 175,000 tons.

As for Japan, its tonnage was determined as follows: at the end of 1921, the displacement of the American fleet was 2,052,000 tons (counting together ships in service and under construction), and the Japanese - 1,042,042 tons, i.e. about 50% tonnage of the US Navy. It was decided to keep this proportion, hence the figure of 500,000 tons for the imperial fleet. The Japanese managed to bargain for another 10% of the American tonnage - in total they accumulated 600,000 tons, of which 300,000 tons were for battleships.

Thus, the proportions of the tonnage of battleships for 5 states should have been 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75. It was also proposed that the standard displacement of the new battleships should not exceed 35,000 tons, and the caliber of the guns should be 406 mm.

At the same time, the Americans took as a basis the characteristics of their newest battleships of the Colorado class, a standard displacement of 32,500 tons, maximum width - 30 meters, draft - 9.5 meters, armament - 8 guns of 406 mm caliber, cruising range - 10,000 miles at 10 knots. Meanwhile, the width of the Panama Canal locks was then 35 meters. In other words, larger battleships could not pass through this channel.

The second group of warships was divided into three categories: light surface units (cruisers and destroyers), submarines, aircraft carriers (aircraft carriers and seaplane carriers).

For three states, limits were introduced in this group. Light surface ships of the USA and Great Britain - 450,000 tons each, Japan - 270,000 tons; US and British submarines - 90,000 tons each, Japan - 54,000 tons; aircraft-carrying ships of the USA and Great Britain - 80,000 tons each, Japan - 48,000 tons.

It was also proposed to complete the construction of the ships of this group, which were under construction. And the tonnage exceeding the established limits was proposed to be scrapped only after the complete replacement of outdated ships. The service life was set as follows: for battleships and aircraft-carrying ships - 20 years; for cruisers - 17 years, for destroyers and submarines - 12 years.

For all other combat units with a displacement of less than 3,000 tons, with a speed of up to 15 knots, armed with guns of up to 127 mm caliber, no restrictions were envisaged.

The countries participating in the treaty were supposed to provide all interested parties with comprehensive information about the timing of the replacement of ships and the tactical and technical data of new units under construction. It was stipulated that large warships to be written off cannot be sold to third countries and that such ships for third countries cannot be built at the shipyards of the participating countries.

***

On November 15, a discussion began on the American proposals. At the same time, a significant divergence of opinions emerged. The French delegation, offended by the fact that France was reduced to the level of a minor maritime power (parity with Italy), demanded equal tonnage with the Japanese fleet. The French motivated this by the large length of their coastline, as well as by the need to protect communications linking the metropolis with the colonies.

France planned to create two line squadrons - the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, within the 175,000 tons offered to her, she could only have 5 battleships (35,000 tons each), of which only one squadron could be made. Referring to the above-mentioned mathematical equality, the French argued that thanks to the restrictions imposed on the German fleet by the Treaty of Versailles, they, the French, could maintain the existing tonnage, that is, 575,000 tons. Consequently, the total displacement of their battleships should be 290,000 tons, that is, almost the same as that of the Japanese fleet.

However, these demands met with sharp opposition from Britain, France's eternal rival. England did not want the recent ally to increase the tonnage of its fleet at the expense of the Germans. The British motivated their position by the fact that in the future the German fleet could increase and then the mentioned equality would be violated, and the three main European fleets would exceed the British fleet in their tonnage. Incidentally, this argument testified that just two years after Versailles, the British were already ready to turn a blind eye to the revival of German naval power.

Both Anglo-Saxon states firmly adhered to this position. When the French delegation demanded directives from Paris, Hughes energetically pressured French Prime Minister Aristide Briand, declaring that if they refused, it was France that "in the eyes of the world community will be responsible for disrupting the disarmament conference." Briand capitulated. As compensation, the French delegation bargained for itself a larger tonnage of light units and submarines, strongly rejecting the 200,000 tons offered to it. She demanded 420,000 tons, including 90,000 tons for submarines.

Against this, in turn, Great Britain began to protest, which still too well remembered the massacre that German submarines had inflicted on its commercial fleet. The British delegation said that such a number of French submarines posed a threat to the British empire. British spokesman Lord Lee said: “France has never had to fear an invasion from Britain, which has a weak army; British ships of the line cannot threaten the existence of France for one hour. But France can completely destroy England with the help of submarines. " On this basis, he demanded a complete cessation of their construction.

But then the British met with a decisive rebuff. The French representative retorted: "If England does not intend to use her battleships against France, which she holds, in all likelihood, for catching sardines, then let poor France be allowed to build submarines for botanical research of the seabed." The French were supported by Italians, Japanese and Americans, who were also supporters of this type of weapon. The British delegation had to give in.

Outwardly, the Japanese delegation seemed satisfied with the third place in the world. The Japanese were worried about other problems, in comparison with which the issues of the tonnage of battleships faded into the background. First of all, they feared the Anglo-American rapprochement in the Pacific Ocean and the expansion of American naval bases in the Philippines and the island of Guam. If this happened, the US fleet would be much closer to the Japanese islands.

Another factor influenced Japan's compliance, albeit to a lesser extent - the fate of the battleship "Mutsu". According to American proposals, he was to be scrapped. Since its construction was completely completed on October 24, 1921, it was important for Japan to keep it in order to have two ships with 406 mm artillery. Therefore, they suggested scrapping the outdated Settsu dreadnought instead (it was launched in 1911; 12 305 mm guns). Thus, the total number of destroyed ships was maintained, but the total displacement of the remaining units increased by 13,600 tons, to 313,000 tons.

The negotiators met this proposal with hostility. They really did not want to leave at the disposal of the Japanese two newest battleships of great combat power. However, the Americans unexpectedly came to the aid of the Asians. Two of their ships with 406 mm guns - "Colorado" and "West Virginia", 80% ready, were also intended for scrapping. Taking advantage of the precedent with "Mutsu", the Americans promised that they would complete the construction of these two ships, and instead they would dismantle two older ones - "North Dacota" and "Delaware". Again, the total number of ships did not change, but the total tonnage increased by 25,200 tons (up to 525,850 tons).

Here the British already sharply protested, who did not have a single battleship built after the Battle of Jutland at all. Their most powerful ship, the battle cruiser Hood, was built according to old plans, only partially modified after the battle in May 1916.

Japanese battleship"Mutsu"

To break the resistance of the British, the conference agreed to the fact that in order to maintain balance, Great Britain should build 2 new battleships of 35,000 tons each with 406 mm guns. Upon entering service, they were supposed to replace 3 ships of the "King George V" class and one of the "Orion" type, due to which the number of battleships in the British fleet would be reduced to 20, while their total tonnage would be 558,950 tons, which gave an excess over the American fleet of 33,100 tons. Such an excess of the parties was recognized as acceptable, since all British dreadnoughts were built before 1916 and over the next 10 years they all approached To the upper bar of the service life.

Of course, the question of the "newest" battleships for France and Italy was not even raised, which further infuriated the French, who had battleships of exclusively pre-war design. Even 5 unfinished battleships of the "Normandie" class were laid down in 1913, that is, they are morally outdated long ago. To sweeten the bitter pill, France was allowed to temporarily maintain a tonnage exceeding the permissible 175,000 tons, namely 221,170 tons, and after 1927 France could begin replacing old battleships with new ones, but already within the tonnage established by the agreement.

The same permission was received by Italy, whose line fleet was in an almost deplorable state (of the 15 battleships she had in 1921, only 5 were of real combat value, the remaining 10 were hopelessly outdated and, moreover, heavily worn out).

***

The list of battleships and battle cruisers, the possession of which was authorized, was as follows.

United Kingdom: Ajax, Barham, Benbow, Centurion, Emperor of India, Hood, Iron Duke, King George V, Malaya, Malborough, Queen Elizabeth, Ramillies, Renown, Repulse, Resolution, Revenge, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign, Thunderer, Tiger, Valiant, Warspite.

Only 22 units with a total displacement of 580.450 tons. After the entry into service of two new battleships, permitted To construction ("Nelson" and "Rodney"), were scrapped "Ajax", "Centurion", "King George V" and "Thunderer", and the total tonnage of 20 ships amounted to 558.950 tons.

USA: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, OkIahoma, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming.

A total of 18 units with a total displacement of 500.650) tons. Upon completion of construction, the battleships Colorado and Vest Virginia replaced the battleships Delaware and North Dacota, for a total displacement of 525,850 tons.

Japan: Fuso, Haruna, Hiei, Hyuga, lse, Kirisima. Kongo, Mutsu, Nagato, Yamashiro.

Only 10 units with a total displacement of 313,300 tons.

France: Bretange, Condorcet, Courbet. Diderot, France, Jean Bart, Lorraine, Paris, Provence, Voltaire.

Only 10 units with a total displacement of 221,170 tons. Taking into account the fact that all these ships, launched in 1909-12, were outdated long ago, it was allowed to build 3 new battleships with a standard displacement of 35,000 tons, with their laying in 1927, 1929 and 1931. However, France was unable to use this permit due to lack of funds.

Italy: Andrea Doria, Caio Duilio, Conte di Cavour. Dante Alighieri, Giulio Cesare, Leonardo da Vinci, Napoli, Regina Elena, Roma, Vittorio Emanuele.

Only 10 units with a total displacement of 182.800 tons. However, the last 4 ships were launched back in 1904-07. and were armadillos (dreadnoughts). The dreadnought "Leonardo da Vinci", which sank in Taranto from the explosion of the cellars on August 2, 1916, was raised in November 1919 and docked, but due to lack of funds it was not repaired. It was scrapped in 1922. Therefore, the Italians were also allowed to build 3 new battleships of 35,000 tons each, with their laying down in 1927, 1929, 1931. Lack of funds prevented the use of this permit.

***

After having dealt with the battleships, the delegations again took up the submarines. But now it was a question of limiting submarine warfare against the merchant fleet.

A member of the US delegation, Senator E. Root, reported on this issue. The essence of his proposals was that in all cases the cargo should be checked. If the ship is subject to destruction after inspection, then it is necessary to guarantee the life of its passengers and crew. Without observing these conditions, the ship cannot be attacked, and if the check is impossible, then the attack must be abandoned. Violators of these ordinances are liable to be tried as war criminals.

Under pressure from Hughes, Root's proposals were approved and on January 6, 1922, the delegates approved the final version of the text of a separate treaty, consisting of three points, on the rules of submarine warfare against the merchant fleet. Paragraph 1 contained the aforementioned proposals of Ruth; paragraph 2 called on the peoples of the world, on behalf of the parties to the treaty, to conclude a comprehensive treaty establishing the rules for the conduct of submarine warfare; paragraph 3 called on international law to enact a ban on the use of submarines to disrupt maritime trade.

Despite the fact that the representatives of France signed this treaty, the French government refused to ratify it, wanting by expanding the submarine fleet to compensate for the superiority of the battle fleet of Great Britain. Anglo-French disputes over this issue continued until the London conference in 1930.

***

During the discussions in Washington, a dividing line clearly emerged between the conference participants. On one side were the United States and Great Britain, on the other - Japan, France and Italy. Both groups pursued opposing interests, and both wanted to maximize the benefits of the adopted restrictions. This atmosphere in the negotiations was not conducive to Wilson's original idea of ​​complete disarmament.

It became known that before the conference there were confidential negotiations between the British and the Americans, during which the United States received consent to its main proposals in exchange for a promise that in the process of general naval disarmament, the British fleet will retain its position of the leading in the world. True, Great Britain still had to abandon the first position among the fleets, but it was better to "share it with a relative" than it could have happened to the Japanese if the arms race had continued.

The Germans, as rivals at sea, could no longer be reckoned with, while France had pulled out far ahead in terms of ground forces. Therefore, the efforts of British diplomacy were aimed at limiting at least the naval forces of France. With the support of the United States, these efforts have been crowned with success. In turn, the French managed to avoid discussing the problem of limiting the ground forces (which the British called for), so they also had their own consolation.

As for the aircraft-carrying ships, the maximum displacement (27 thousand tons) and the caliber of the main artillery (no more than 203 mm) were determined. Their total tonnage was also increased in comparison with the American proposal, but the quantitative ratio remained in the proportion of 5: 5: 3.

With regard to cruisers, the conference did not accept any restrictions, except for determining the maximum permissible tonnage (10 thousand tons) and the caliber of the main artillery (203 mm).

On ships of other classes, in view of the decisive opposition of France, no agreement was reached. The only thing was that they signed an agreement regarding the construction of light ships at the shipyards of the participating countries by order of third countries, but it was forbidden to sell or transfer already built units to them.

***

On February 6, 1922, the final version of the treaty, which went down in history as "Washington", was signed. It consisted of three sections containing 24 articles. The first section (Articles 1? 20) contained the most important decrees concerning the tonnage and armament of warships of the main classes.

The following tonnage amounts have been determined for the parties to the agreement. Battleships - Great Britain and the USA - 525,000 tons each, Japan - 315,000 tons, France and Italy - 175,000 tons each (Art. 4). Aircraft carriers (aircraft carriers and seaplane carriers) - Great Britain and the United States, 135,000 tons each, Japan - 81,000 tons, France and Italy - 60,000 tons each (Article 7).

The maximum permissible displacement of the battleship was set at 35,000 tons - excluding the weight of fuel and lubricant, water for boilers, ammunition, food, crew (article 5), and the caliber of its main artillery was 406 mm (article 6). Only Great Britain, as an exception, was allowed to leave in service the battle cruiser "Hood" with a displacement of 42,100 tons.

The displacement of the aircraft carrier was not to exceed 27,000 tons (Article 9), and each of the parties to the treaty was allowed to convert two battleships or battle cruisers from among those intended for scrapping into aircraft carriers, provided that the displacement of each of them did not exceed 33,000 tons. The caliber of the aircraft carrier's guns was limited to 203 mm, the number of such guns was 10 barrels for ships with a displacement of up to 27,000 tons and 8 barrels for ships of a larger displacement (Article 10).

The treaty gave a list of those battleships and battle cruisers that could remain in the combat composition of the fleets (Appendix 5), as well as decrees concerning the service life and methods of replacing battleships and aircraft carriers. With the exception of ships lost as a result of accidents, which could be replaced immediately, the rest of the ships were allowed to be replaced with new ones only after 20 years of operation.

The maximum displacement of the cruisers was determined at 10,000 tons, and the caliber of their guns at 203 mm (Art. 12). It should be noted that in this case, the delegates took as a model the British cruisers of the "Effingham" class, which had just entered service. Their displacement was 9800 tons, and the armament was represented by seven 190 mm guns.

It was forbidden in peacetime to convert civilian ships into warships. The only thing that was allowed was to strengthen the decks so that in the future, if necessary, they could be equipped with guns with a caliber of up to 152 mm (Art. 14).

In the Pacific Ocean basin, the parties to the treaty were allowed to build naval bases in the following regions (Article 19): 1) Great Britain - on the shores of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as in Singapore. She was forbidden to fortify the base in Hong Kong; 2) USA - on the west coast of the States, in Alaska, in the Panama Canal region, in Hawaii. They were forbidden to strengthen the Aleuts, the Philippines and Guam; 3) Japan - on the Japanese islands themselves, in the Korea Strait region, on Sakhalin. It was forbidden to strengthen the Kuriles, the Bonin archipelagos, Pescadores, Ryukyu (Okinawa) and Formosa Island (Taiwan).

***

The contract was considered valid until December 31, 1936 (section 3, article 23), and this period was subject to automatic extension, if two years before its expiration, none of the parties terminated it. The cancellation of the agreement also came automatically two years after the withdrawal of one of the participants.

Eight years after the signing of the treaty, a new conference was to be convened to clarify the restrictions on battleships in the light of new scientific and technological advances (Article 21).

It was possible to evade the fulfillment of the prescriptions of the treaty only in case of war, having previously notified the other participants (Article 22). A special protocol attached to the treaty contained, in addition to the above-mentioned decree concerning the methods of conducting submarine warfare, also a ban on the use of toxic substances in combat operations at sea.

***

Assessing the results of the Washington Conference, it should be emphasized that for some time it softened the differences between the Entente states. On the other hand, it deepened and supplemented the Treaty of Versailles, becoming the second most important component of the so-called Versailles-Washington system. which formed the then international relations.

Of course, like any treaty, the Washington Agreement represented a certain compromise. For this alone, it could not contain the naval arms race. It would be more correct to say that this agreement changed the course of the naval policy of some countries. Thus, the absence of quantitative restrictions in the category of light surface units and submarines allowed all countries, especially those "offended" in the distribution of the tonnage of large ships (Japan, France, Italy), to take advantage of this opportunity to increase their fleets. In the future, they all did just that.

The ruling circles of the United States were most satisfied with the results of the conference. Although the American losses associated with the destruction of unfinished battleships and battle cruisers amounted to about $ 357 million, the treaty limited Japan's appetites, returned the "open door" policy useful for the United States to China, and established the principle of parity with the British Navy. Thus, the "income" has exceeded the "expense".

Implementation of the decisions of the Washington Treaty

So, the Washington Treaty introduced specific qualitative and quantitative restrictions in the construction of battleships and aircraft carriers, as well as qualitative in the construction of cruisers, while leaving complete freedom of action in the construction of destroyers, submarines and ships of other classes.

Battleships

According to the contract, To only Great Britain immediately started building new battleships. Two new ships (recall, instead of three types "King George V" and one type "Orion"), were laid down on the stocks already in 1922.

These were Rodney and Nelson, launched in 1925 and commissioned in 1927. When designing them, the projects of the 1921 battle cruisers were partially used, the construction of which was stopped in accordance with the decisions of the conference.

With a standard displacement of 33.900 tons (Rodney) and 33.950 tons (Nelson), they were armed with 9 406 mm guns with a firing range of 32 km, 12 152 mm guns, 6 120 mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as 8 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and 15 machine guns. In addition, they had two 609 mm underwater torpedo tubes. Powerful armor (waterline - 356 mm, decks from 76 to 159 mm, main turret 178 × 406 mm) protected only the vital parts of the ship, but still significantly reduced the speed, which was only 23 knots.

The main architectural feature of the Nelson-class battleships was that all three turrets of 406-mm guns (1300 tons each) were in the bow. The three-legged foremast was replaced by a five-story prismatic superstructure. To avoid its smoke, the pipe was moved to the stern side, so that the boilers were behind the propeller turbines, and not in front of them. Much attention was paid to anti-torpedo protection and the division of the ship into watertight compartments. The cost of each battleship was £ 14,893,538. In general, the result is very powerful, but rather slow-moving ships.

Although after the Washington Treaty, only the most modern battleships remained in the fleets of the great powers, whose service life did not exceed 10 years, however, due to the continuous progress of technology, as well as due to the combat experience gained in local conflicts and "small wars", with the passage of time arose the need for their modernization.

Improved their ships not only the parties to the treaty, but also other states that had battleships or battleships of coastal defense. In the period 1922-1931. such modernization was carried out by Great Britain (5 ships of the Revenge type, 5 of the Queen Elizabeth type); France (3 ships of the "Courbet" class, 3 of the "Bretagne" types); United States (2 types of "Florida", 2 types of "Wyoming", 2 types of "New York", 2 types of "Nevada"); Japan (3 types of "Kongo"); (3 types "Gangut"); Argentina (2 types of "Rivadavia"); Chile ("Almirante Latorre"); Turkey ("Yawus Selim"); Germany (3 old battleships of the "Schlesien" class).

The modernization consisted, first of all, in the installation of new equipment for fire control, which made it possible to conduct aimed fire at distances over 20 km; in the restructuring of armored towers to increase the barrel lift angle (for example, increasing the angle of American 356-mm guns from 15 degrees to 30 increased their range from 19 km to 30 km; for British 381-mm guns, the transition from 20 degrees to 30 increased the range from 21 up to 29 km); in strengthening anti-aircraft artillery (as a rule, 4 × 8 guns of 75 × 127 mm caliber); in the dismantling of torpedo tubes and part of the casemate medium artillery.

In addition, the anti-torpedo protection was improved by installing special caissons (the so-called "boules") in the underwater part of the hull. They increased the width of the ship by how many meters and thereby removed the place of the torpedo explosion from the hull itself, which reduced the consequences of this explosion. The horizontal armoring of decks was also strengthened for protection from aerial bombs and from shells fired from a long distance.

At the same time, steam engines were replaced by turbines, and instead of coal boilers, boilers on liquid fuel - fuel oil - were installed. This made the ships much lighter, which made it possible to increase either speed or booking. On the upper deck, one or two catapults were stirred for launching seaplanes, correcting the fire of the main battery guns, as well as cranes for lifting these aircraft from the water.

The modernization radically changed the original appearance of the battleships. Gradually, all these changes led to the disappearance of the difference between battleships and battle cruisers, so that by the end of the 1920s, despite the preservation of the theoretical division, they practically became ships of the same class. The modernization was carried out until the very beginning of the Second World War.

Aircraft carriers, seaplane carriers, air transport

According to the ideas of the 1920s, naval aviation was supposed to bomb enemy ships, adjust the fire of the main caliber guns of battleships and cruisers, conduct reconnaissance of the enemy's water area and bases, and protect their ships from enemy aircraft. Considering the short flight range of the aircraft of that time, all these actions became possible only with the use of the appropriate ships - aircraft carriers and seaplane carriers, which had equipment that made it possible for aircraft to take off and land.

At first, both of these classes occupied almost the same positions, but soon the large autonomy of aircraft carriers (the ability to use regardless of the state of the sea, atmospheric conditions and without speed limits during takeoff and landing of aircraft) decisively pushed them to the first place among all subclasses of aircraft carriers.

The convenient launch deck, which allows for the takeoff and landing of wheeled aircraft, as well as spacious hangars, led to the fact that the number of their air groups quickly exceeded 20, reaching a record mark of 90 on American aircraft carriers of the Lexington class. In addition to aircraft, the aircraft carriers had a fairly strong artillery armament (4 × 16 guns of caliber from 120 to 203 mm and machine guns), since it was believed that they themselves had to defend themselves against attacks by light surface ships of the enemy. At that time, the problem of landing high-speed bombers on aircraft carriers had not yet been resolved, so their air groups consisted mainly of fighters and reconnaissance aircraft.

In 1921-1930, 13 aircraft carriers entered service (5 in Great Britain, 3 in the USA, 3 in Japan), of which 9 were converted battle cruisers or battleships, 2 were rebuilt civilian ships, and only 2 were designed from the very beginning as aircraft carriers. It was these two ships that demonstrated outstanding design solutions and principles. The British aircraft carrier "Hermes", built in 1919-1924, was distinguished by a long flight deck (182 m), under which there were hangars. All deck superstructures and anti-aircraft artillery were located on the starboard side in the so-called "island", due to which almost the entire width of the deck (27 m) was available to aircraft. It was this design solution that later became the model for most types of aircraft carriers.

Another successful variant was the Japanese "Hosho", built in 1918-1922. The not too large launch deck (163 × 19 m) allowed only light aircraft to take off and land, but it should be borne in mind that the Japanese achieved its maximum area by removing the originally designed superstructures. The emission of combustion products from steam boilers was carried out through pipes in the sides, below the level of the flight deck, where all the main guns were located. This general arrangement ("smooth deck") became typical of later Japanese aircraft carriers.

Seaplane transports, commonly referred to as seaplane carriers, did not have a launch deck. Seaplanes took off with the help of catapults, and after completing the assignment they landed on the water near the ship and were lifted onto the deck by cranes.

At first, certain hopes were pinned on this subclass of ships. It was assumed that they would interact with the reconnaissance forces of the fleet, but the seaplane carriers had to stop to lift the aircraft from the water to the deck, which was too much of a risk in the face of the threat from submarines. In addition, the launch and reception of seaplanes could not be carried out in fresh weather. In addition, these ships were relatively slow-moving, and the number of their air groups was inferior to aircraft carriers.

During the period under review, 6 seaplane carriers entered service, of which 3 were converted merchant ships, and 3 were of special construction. Except for Japan, where 4 more seaplane carriers were built in the 30s, no one built more such ships until World War II.

Cruisers

The limitation of the total tonnage of battleships caused an increase in interest in cruisers. High speed and good maneuverability allowed them to evade battles with battleships, to avoid attacks from submarines and aircraft, while strong artillery weapons made it possible to defeat surface ships of all other classes. But at the beginning of the 1920s, the last of the series of cruisers, begun by construction during the war, entered service.

The first cruisers fully designed and built after the war were the French cruisers of the Duguay Trouin class, completed in 1926-27, with a displacement of 7250 tons. According to the concept of the then French theorists, they had no armor at all, but they developed a speed of 34 knots (63 km / h). The same concept was adopted by the Italians, who until 1933 built 6 similar cruisers: 4 of the Alberto di Giussano type (5,070 tons, speed 37 knots) and 2 types of Luigi Cadorna (5,000 tons, speed 42 knots). Later, however, both the Italians and the French abandoned the concept of light bullet cruisers in favor of the so-called "Washington" cruisers.

The Washington Treaty has set fairly high quality limits for ships of this class. Therefore, as soon as restrictions on the number of battleships were introduced, the following in importance artillery ships - cruisers - immediately took an important place in the programs of expansion and reorganization of the fleets of the five great naval powers for 1923-27. Until the end of 1932, the construction of 40 cruisers was completed (not counting 2 British types "York" at 8390 tons and 4 Japanese types "Furutaka" and "Aoba" at 8100? 8300 tons) and more than 10 were built.

Possessing a large radius of action, the "Washington" cruisers were intended to control sea communications, long-range reconnaissance, and to deliver artillery strikes against enemy ships and formations. Guns of 203 mm caliber had a range 30% greater than 152-mm guns, and shells (weighing 113 × 123 kg) had a significant destructive power of shells. In addition, these ships were distinguished by a long cruising range (10,000 miles and more), sufficiently strong anti-aircraft artillery, powerful torpedo armament. In addition, they carried 2 × 4 seaplanes, launched from catapults.

When meeting with small groups of enemy ships, the Washington cruisers could fight with them, or, thanks to their high speed, evade it. High speed was the main trump card of these ships. To provide it, it was necessary to significantly increase the power of the machines. To obtain the required displacement reserve, the designers weakened the armor. Some Washington cruisers had minimal armor, others had none at all, for example, the British cruisers, which were contemptuously nicknamed the "tin class" - the "class of cans" (or cans).

This feature of their design caused a lot of criticism, especially since they themselves were too large a target for projectiles and aerial bombs (hull length of about 170 × 200, width of about 20 meters). The usefulness of the 203mm guns was also problematic. They did not pose any threat to battleships, and in conditions of limited visibility (at night, in fog), when the fighting distance was reduced, 203-mm guns were significantly inferior to 152-mm guns in terms of rate of fire.

Besides, the Washington cruisers were too expensive. They cost an average of £ 1.5? 2 million. In particular, this is also why To At the end of the 1920s, two trends in the construction of cruisers were determined: according to the first, armor was strengthened, according to the second, they built smaller ships, with lighter artillery, but cheap and in large series.

on the limitation of naval arms and Pacific and Far Eastern issues - was convened at the initiative of the United States and took place in Washington from 12. XI 1921 to 6. II 1922. The conference was attended by 9 powers: the United States, the British Empire (Great Britain, the dominions and India), Japan. France, Italy, China, Belgium, Portugal and Holland. The United States was represented by Secretary of State Hughes, Lodge, Underwood and Ruth; England by Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, Lee and Geddes. The Dominions and India were represented by independent delegates; only the Union of South Africa authorized Balfour to be its representative. Therefore, Balfour signed on the relevant documents twice: both as a representative of England and as a representative of the Union of South Africa; Japan was represented by Kato, Sidehara, Tokugawa and Hanihara; France - by Briand, Viviani, Sarro and Jusserand; Italy - by Schanzer, Ricci and Albertini. Another 14. XII 1920 Senator Bora made a proposal to convene a conference on the limitation of naval arms. 24. II 1921 this proposal was included as an amendment to the Naval Bill passed by Congress. The problem of naval weapons was closely related to the Pacific and Far Eastern issues, in particular to the fate Anglo-Japanese Union(cm.). In February 1921, Canadian Prime Minister Meigen put forward a proposal to conclude a treaty between four powers (USA, Great Britain, Japan and France) instead of the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty. Meigen's plan was discussed at the British Imperial Conference in the summer of 1921. 5. VII 1921, the British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon, in talks with US Ambassador Harvey, proposed to include Far Eastern and Pacific issues on the agenda of the projected conference. 10. VII 1921 US Secretary of State Hughes made a public statement proposing to convene a conference in Washington. An official invitation was sent to the Powers on behalf of the US government. The situation in the Far East on the eve of the Washington Conference was very tense. While the United States and Great Britain were bound by the 1914-18 war in Europe, Japan gained complete free hand in the Far East and unilaterally upset the pre-war balance of power on the Asian continent and in the Pacific (see. "Twenty-one requirements"). After the end of the First World War, Britain and especially the United States wanted to limit Japanese penetration into China and regain the positions they had lost in the Far East. American diplomacy showed particular interest in this respect. The convening of the conference was explained not only by the desire of the United States and England to suspend Japanese aggression in the Far East, but also by the fact that after the elimination of the naval power of Germany, the naval rivalry of the great powers was mainly associated with the Pacific Ocean as the main potential bridgehead of naval war. A special role was played by the Anglo-American naval rivalry, which threatened to lead to the same results as the previous Anglo-German naval rivalry. The diplomacy of the United States and England sought to stabilize international relations in China and the Far East on a new basis, as well as to prevent a new naval arms race, which threatened military conflicts. American diplomacy played the leading role. Although isolationism dominated US foreign policy and Harding's inaugural speech 4. I II 4921 heralded "traditional non-interference in Old World affairs," isolationism almost never touched the White House's Pacific and Far Eastern policies. Wilson's consent to Shandong remaining in Japan's hands caused great discontent in America and was one of the reasons for the Senate's refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson's opponents accused him of sacrificing America's Far Eastern interests in the name of European politics. American economic activity — the creation in the late 1920s of an international banking consortium in China — was also spearheaded against Japan. Japan was interested in preserving the existing situation and preventing a collective discussion of Far Eastern issues. When the United States announced its intention to convene a conference in Washington, Japanese diplomats said that "Japan is being brought to justice by the Anglo-American tribunal." After unsuccessful attempts to achieve the cancellation of the conference, the Japanese tried to ensure that "already resolved issues are not discussed," in particular, they meant the treaties imposed on China in 1915 ("Twenty-one Demands"), and proposed to convene a preliminary conference of three powers (USA, England and Japan), etc. All these attempts met with active opposition from the White House diplomacy. The Washington Conference was a typical example of "new", "ligonation" (although it was convened outside the League of Nations), seemingly very democratic diplomacy. The leaders of the conference in every possible way advertised its publicity, the rejection of secret diplomacy, etc. The speeches and speeches of the delegates were published in newspapers and magazines, and even a verbatim report of the conference was published. But this publicity was only ostentatious. None of the decisive questions of big politics were resolved at the official sessions of the conference. Everything was done behind the scenes of the conference during the negotiations that took place at the meetings of the "big three", which included Hughes, Balfour and Cato. Even the French delegation was not aware of all matters. The French delegation learned about the Treaty of Four Powers, which the United States, Britain, Japan and France were supposed to sign only two days before it was signed. Even less reckoned with the Italian delegation, which, despite its protests, was removed from participation in the four-power treaty. The main documents of the British government were: 1) the agreement of the four powers on the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; 2) the treaty of the nine powers on the principle of "open doors" in China; 3) the treaty of the five powers on the limitation of naval arms. The question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was not discussed at the conference itself: it was predetermined by the Big Three agreement. Since the establishment of the League of Nations, the question of the incompatibility of the Anglo-Japanese alliance with the charter of the League of Nations has been discussed. In England, pacifist leaders, supporters of the League of Nations, and Labor insisted on the elimination of this alliance. Opponents of the resumption of the alliance with Japan pointed out, in particular, that this military alliance arouses China's hostility towards England. But their main argument was that in the presence of sharp Japanese-American contradictions, an alliance with Japan threatened England with a military clash with the United States and the collapse of the British Empire, since Canada, for example, would not have taken part in a war against the United States. Canada, indeed, strongly opposed the resumption of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Australia and New Zealand generally supported the idea of ​​a renewed alliance with Japan, fearing that otherwise they would be directly threatened by Japanese aggression. However, even in these dominions there was strong opposition to the renewal of the union, in particular from the Labor party. Both before the British Empire and at the conference itself, American diplomacy exerted strong pressure on England, demanding the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The outcome of a possible war between the United States and Japan was largely determined by whose side Britain would have found itself on. In particular, without the use of British bases, the American fleet would not have been able to act effectively against Japan. Attempts by the British to find some kind of compromise in order to renew the alliance and appease America were unsuccessful. In April 1921, the New York Times editor Oaks arrived on an unofficial mission in London and negotiated with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lee, on the limitation of naval armaments and the fate of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The British offered to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance, to establish equality between the British and American fleets, and to guarantee the security of the United States in the Atlantic Ocean so that the United States could concentrate its fleet in the Pacific Ocean. England would then keep in her hands the "keys of the Pacific equilibrium." But White House diplomacy vehemently rejected any proposals involving the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. To put pressure on England, she used not only Canada, but also the Irish question. In particular, in June 1921 Hughes, in a conversation with the British ambassador Geddes, threatened to support Ireland against England if England renewed its alliance with Japan. At first, at the suggestion of England, negotiations were held in the east to conclude a trilateral agreement that would replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The British project provided for the possibility for two of the contracting parties to enter into military agreements with each other, provided that these agreements were of a defensive nature. However, the American delegates objected to this attempt to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance in one form or another. France was involved in the draft agreement. A treaty was concluded between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan on 13 XII 1921 (see. Four Powers Treaty) concerning their island possessions and island territories in the Pacific Ocean, after the ratification of which the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, which served as the basis of British policy in the Far East, was losing force. The most important issue that was discussed at the VC was the question of China. American diplomacy sharply opposed Japanese attempts to preserve all the positions captured in China. Given that the unification of China and the acceleration of its capitalist development will expand the domestic market in China and open up new opportunities for American trade and investment, White House diplomacy was not averse to even flirting with the national liberation movement of the Chinese people. The main diplomatic task of the United States in Eastern Korea was to compel Japan to retreat on the Chinese question, to force it to abandon the "21 demands," and to establish the principle of "open doors" and equal opportunities in China, proclaimed back in 1899 by US Secretary of State Gay. British diplomacy tried to reach a compromise solution. First of all, she feared the national liberation movement in China and its influence on India. She regarded Japan as "the gendarme of the Far East." Since the Japanese expansion encompassed mainly the region of Manchuria and northern China, and not the Yangtze Valley and southern China (where two-thirds of British capital investments are concentrated), England hoped to negotiate a "modus vivendi" with Japan based on the established traditional division of spheres of influence. Along with this, British diplomacy wanted to keep China from drawing closer to Soviet Russia and the United States. In addition, Japanese expansion nevertheless caused great damage to British interests in China. Finally, the pressure of American diplomacy played a role: As a result, Britain, in spite of all the zigzags and vacillations, in general came out on the Chinese question together with the United States against Japan. Balfour announced at the conference that he would abandon the policy of spheres of influence and support an open door policy and equal opportunity. 6. II 1922 was signed a treaty of nine powers: the United States, the British Empire, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and China. The signatory powers in Art. I pledged to: respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China; provide China with the fullest and unhindered opportunity to develop and maintain a viable and durable government; use their influence to effectively establish and maintain the principle of equal opportunity for trade and industry of all nations throughout China; refrain from using the current situation in China in order to obtain special rights and advantages that could harm the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, or from maintaining activities hostile to the security of these states. Art. III obliged the contracting powers in accordance with the principle of "open doors" not to seek monopolies or advantages, as well as special privileges in any particular region of China, which would harm the citizens of other countries. Art. IV stated that the contracting parties refuse to create spheres of influence in certain parts of Chinese territory. The treaty did not contain any mention of how to implement the "open door" policy or how to prevent violations of this policy. The Powers pledged to respect (but not protect) China's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Art. VII provided only for the possibility of exchange of views between the contracting powers in case of violation of the treaty. A number of concessions were made to China in the east. A special resolution provided for the possibility in the future of the abolition of the rights of extraterritoriality. Japan, under an agreement concluded with China on 4. II 1922, pledged to cleanse Shandong and was forced to actually retreat from the "21 demands." However, she did not agree to formally abandon them, despite China's insistence. On the contrary, the Japanese representative of Sidehara, speaking at the plenary session of the conference, said that there could be no talk of annulling the 1915 treaties, since they were "legally signed and sealed." He, speaking on 4. II, once again confirmed the existence of Japan's "special rights" in China: "To say that Japan has special interests in China is simply to state a clear and contemporary fact." Japan decisively rejected China's demand for the withdrawal of troops from southern Manchuria. England on the east side announced its renunciation of the leased territory of Weihaiwei, but when it came to the concession of Kowloon, Balfour said that here, for economic and strategic reasons, England would not make any concessions. A number of decisions of the Supreme Court on economic and military issues were nothing more than a violation of China's sovereignty and interference in its internal affairs. For the first time in the east coast, England's renunciation of the traditional "two power standard", according to which Britain maintained a navy equal in strength to the two strongest fleets of other powers, was enshrined in a treaty act. By the time the First World War ended, the Anglo-American naval rivalry had become tense. Continuing the naval arms race meant going into an inevitable clash with America. In this clash, America would not only have superior economic and financial resources, but would also be in a more advantageous political and strategic position, in particular due to its ties with the British dominions, especially with Canada. England was forced to abandon unconditional domination of the seas and agree that the US fleet was equal in strength to the British fleet. As early as 17. III 1920, the first lord of the Admiralty, Long, made a statement that England would be content with a fleet that was not inferior in strength to the strongest fleet of another power. This position was confirmed by the imperial conference of 1921. On the other hand, the US government in September 1921 made a statement that it would build a fleet equal to the fleet of the strongest naval power, that is, the British. By the time of the Washington Conference, England had the most powerful navy in the world. However, the United States was rapidly building a navy, which threatened for several years not only to catch up, but also to overtake England. Japan carried out the "8 + 8" program, that is, the construction of 8 battleships and 8 battle cruisers. The ratio of the forces of the battleships in 1921 and 1924 (in accordance with the construction programs) was assumed to be the following: The Americans entered the east coast with the following proposal: England should disable a number of old or not yet completed battleships and leave them in service. 22 America should leave 18, Japan - 10. The displacement tonnage of battleships was proposed at 500 thousand for England and America and 300 thousand for Japan, that is, in a ratio of 5: 5: 3. With regard to cruisers, the American proposal boiled down to the fact that Britain and the United States should each leave 450 thousand. m and Japan - 270 thousand, and in relation to aircraft carriers, the United States and England - 80 thousand each, and Japan - 48 thousand. Japan strongly objected to the ratio of 5: 3 and demanded a ratio of 10: 7. However, Japan's demand was rejected, and the Japanese delegation had to accept the ratio proposed by England and America. According to the treaty of the five powers (USA, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy), concluded on the east side of 6. II 1922, the following proportion was established to replace ships of the line between these powers: 5: 5: 3: 13/4: 13 /4. The replacement tonnage of battleships was set at 525,000 for England and the United States, 315,000 for Japan and 175,000 for France and Italy. For aircraft carriers, the total tonnage was set: the USA and England 135 thousand each, Japan - 81 thousand, France and Italy - 60 thousand each. For battleships, the maximum displacement norms were adopted 35 thousand. m with artillery no more than 16-inch., for aircraft carriers 27 thousand. m with artillery no more than 8-inch., for cruisers 10 thousand. m with artillery no more than 8-inch. For ten years from the date of the signing of the treaty, England, the United States and Japan were not supposed to lay down new battleships. The ratio of naval forces established in Washington meant that in the event of a war in the Pacific between Japan and one of the great powers, Japan would have a clear predominance, since neither Britain nor the United States could concentrate more than two-thirds of their fleet in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, i.e. that is, neither Britain nor the United States, acting separately, would have been able to successfully attack Japan in its waters. Although a chauvinist campaign was waged in Japan against the "Washington shame", the balance of power established by the Washington Treaty was essentially favorable for Japan. Japan's major success was Art. 19 treaties of the five powers. Under this article, the United States, the British Empire and Japan agreed not to build bases and fortifications on a number of island possessions in the Pacific Ocean. The United States pledged not to strengthen the island possessions in the Pacific Ocean, with the exception of the Hawaiian Islands and the islands adjacent to the coast of Alaska and the Panama Canal zone (while the Aleutian Islands could not be fortified). England pledged not to fortify Hong Kong and the island possessions east of 110 ° E. (England had the right to strengthen Singapore), with the exception of the island possessions adjacent to the coasts of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Japan pledged not to strengthen the Kuril Islands, Boninsky, Amami-Sima, Formosa, Pescadores, as well as mandates. Japan considered Art. 19 as compensation for the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and for the adoption of the 5: 3 norm. This article was a major strategic gain for Japan, because even without these islands it had sufficiently powerful and closely located naval bases for operations in the western part of the Pacific ocean. Meanwhile, the United States and Britain were deprived of the opportunity to have convenient bases for effective operations in the waters adjacent to Japan. A situation was created that greatly impeded, if necessary, an active action by Britain and the United States against Japan. Obligations arising from Art. 19, were, as it were, a strategic addition to the Treaty of Four Powers and the Treaty of Nine Powers, which did not provide for the possibility of collective action against the violator of the Washington treaties. Therefore, the Washington Naval Treaty caused great discontent in American maritime circles. In England it was also openly admitted that Art. 19 of the treaty leaves Hong Kong and the Philippines in the event of a war at the mercy of the Japanese navy, and that in a war against the British Empire or the United States, "Japan has an important advantage of early successes." The Washington Naval Treaty did not set any restrictions on the total tonnage of the cruising fleet. Likewise, no decisions were made regarding the submarine fleet, although the British delegation insisted on a complete ban on submarines. The question of limiting land and air armaments was also discussed in the airborne battle. The representative of France, Briand, made a speech in which he insisted that the issue of limiting land armaments be made dependent on the degree of moral disarmament in Germany, as well as on the obligations of England and America to actively participate in ensuring the security of France against possible German aggression. England and the USA did not agree with this, and. the question of land disarmament was dropped. Soviet Russia was not invited to the conference. In this regard, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on July 19, 1921 sent a protest to the respective governments and stated that it did not recognize any decisions adopted by the conference: “The Russian government,” the NKID note stated, “ solemnly declares that it does not recognize any decision taken by the said conference, since this meeting will take place without his participation ... top stakeholders ". 2. XI 1921 NKID again protested against the removal of the Soviet Republic from participation in the conference. This note stated that "under such conditions, the decisions of the Washington Conference will inevitably become only a source of new conflicts, new confusion and new upheavals." 8. XII 1921 People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs protested against the discussion of the Sino-Eastern Railway at the Washington Conference. which concerns exclusively China and Russia. The Soviet government declared its rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway and reserved "complete freedom of action to force respect for these rights and to defend the claims arising from them at that moment and by means that it deems convenient and appropriate." No decisions were made on this issue, and China's demand to clear the road was rejected. During the work of the capitalist committee, a delegation from the then existing Far Eastern Republic arrived in Washington and published a number of exposing documents concerning the intervention of the capitalist powers in the Soviet Far East. This publication was of great political importance. At the conference itself, without the participation of the Soviet Republic, a number of issues were discussed that directly concerned Soviet Russia. On the question of CVLC(see) no decisions were made. Japan made a statement about its intention to evacuate its troops from the Soviet Far East. These troops were indeed evacuated at the end of 1922, but under pressure from the Red Army, and not under the influence of Washington's decisions. The VC was a supplement to the Versailles Peace, and its decrees became the basis for a new balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, one of the cornerstones of the Versailles system. At the 18th Party Congress, JV Stalin, speaking about this post-war regime - the Versailles-Washington peace system, pointed out: "The main foundations of this regime were in the Far East - the treaty of nine powers, and in Europe - the Versailles and a number of other treaties." American diplomacy played the main role in the eastern city. She was the main initiator, organizer and potential guarantor of the newly created balance of power in the Far East. Thus, the United States also acted as an indirect guarantor of the entire Versailles system, although it did not sign the Versailles Peace Treaty and did not join the League of Nations. The leading role of the United States in Britain was a manifestation of the sharply increased share of the United States in the world economy and world politics after the First World War. A common front of American and British diplomacy against Japan was established in East Korea, as a result of which Japan was forced to retreat and abandoned a number of positions it had captured in China. However, it retained sufficient positions in its hands to re-launch the offensive against China at a favorable moment. Great Britain not only did not weaken, but, on the contrary, consolidated Japan's monopoly domination in southern Manchuria and created important strategic guarantees for Japan in the event of war. The Washington treaties did not provide for any sanctions against the aggressors. The Washington decisions bore the stamp of the British policy of compromise and the American policy of isolationism. The equilibrium created by the Washington decisions turned out to be extremely unstable and short-lived. Of decisive importance here was the fact that the Soviet Union, a great Pacific power, found itself on the sidelines of resolving issues vital to it. Literature: Washington Conference on Arms Limitation and Pacific and Far Eastern Issues 1921-1922. Full translation of acts and documents. M. 1924.139 s. (Narkomindel). - Conference on the limitation of armament. Washington. Nov. 12, 1921-Febr. 6, 1922. Washington. 1922.1757 p. English text. and French. lang. - Buell, R. L. The Washington conference. New York - London, 1922. XIII, 461 p. - Sullivan, M. The great adventure at Washington. The story of the Conference. London. 1922. XI, 290 p. - Willoughby, W. W. China at the Conference. A report. Baltimore. 1922. XVI, 419 p. -Wou Saofong. La Chine et la conf? Rence de Washington. Paris. 1927.234 p.

Constitution Hall, Washington. The conference was attended by the United States, Great Britain, China, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, as well as five British dominions, although the main issues were resolved by the three strongest maritime powers of the United States - British Empire - Japan. Soviet Russia did not receive an invitation to Washington, as a result of which it declared its non-recognition of any decisions of the conference.

The Washington conference was convened at the initiative of the United States, which hoped to achieve a favorable solution to the issue of naval weapons and consolidate a new balance of forces in China and in the Pacific. The conference was also directed against the national liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. The Soviet government, which did not receive an invitation to the conference, protested on July 19 and November 2, 1921 against her removal from participation in the conference, and on December 8, 1921, sent a protest against the discussion at it of the issue of the Sino-Eastern Railway. In December 1921, a delegation from the Far Eastern Republic arrived in Washington, but it was not admitted to the conference.

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At the time of the conference, the British government had a debt to the United States - $ 4.5 billion, France - $ 3.5 billion, Italy - $ 1.8 billion.

Main contracts

Four Powers Treaty dated December 13, 1921, which became known as the "Quadruple Pacific Treaty" or "Far Eastern Entente". It included countries such as the United States, Britain, France and Japan. The treaty was intended to unite the forces of the allies against the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. Under this treaty, the signatories pledged to mutually respect the rights to islands and island possessions in the Pacific. The treaty also provided for (under pressure from American diplomacy) the liquidation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, which was directed at that time against US plans in the Far East and the Pacific. Some British dominions (primarily Canada), who feared Japan's strengthening at the expense of China and other countries of the Far East, also spoke out against the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Thus, the agreement legalized the status quo and temporary balance of the four powers in the Pacific region.

Five Powers Treaty, better known as the Washington Naval Agreement of 1922. Treaty between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy on the Limitation of Naval Arms. The agreement established the ratio of the tonnage of battleships and aircraft carriers in the following proportion: 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75 (USA, England, Japan, France, Italy, respectively). The US proposal to ban the construction of battleships with a displacement of more than 35 thousand tons was also accepted. The agreement was concluded for a period until December 31, 1936.

Nine Powers Treaty dated February 6, 1922, signed by all participants in the conference. The treaty concerned ensuring guarantees of China's territorial integrity, respect for its sovereignty, and also proclaimed the principle of "open doors and equal opportunities" in relation to China in the field of trade and business and obliged not to resort to using the internal situation in China in order to obtain special rights and privileges. that may harm the rights and interests of other states parties to the treaty. China was considered by the parties to the treaty as a common object of exploitation. This treaty was directed against Japan's claims to monopoly dominance in China. Even earlier, on February 5, 1922, Japan was forced to sign the so-called Washington Agreement- the Sino-Japanese agreement on the evacuation of Japanese troops from the Chinese province of Shandong, as well as on the return to China of the Qingdao-Jinan railway and the Jiao-Zhou territory. The head of the Japanese delegation pledged that the Japanese government would not demand that the Chinese government fulfill the fifth group of "twenty-one demands" of Japan on the appointment of Japanese advisers to the Chinese government, etc. However, Japan rejected China's demand for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from South Manchuria. Simultaneously with the Treaty of Nine Powers, on February 6, 1922, the Treaty on the Chinese Customs Tariff was signed, which consolidated China's customs inequalities.

Versailles system

In historical science, the term "Versailles system" is used to refer to international agreements initiated by the victorious states in the First World War. They were concluded on June 28, 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference between the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Bolivia,

Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hejaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Siam, Czechoslovakia and Uruguay, on the one hand, and Germany - with another.

The Versailles Treaty contained 15 sections (440 articles).

Germany pledged: 1) to adhere to the borders established in accordance with the treaty with Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Denmark, to recognize the independence of these countries and the future agreements of the victorious detainees with Belgium and the Netherlands; 2) carry out the demilitarization of the Rhine zone; 3) return Alsace and Lorraine to French sovereignty and transfer to France for a period of 15 years the right to mine coal in the Saar basin; 4) recognize the independence of all territories of the Russian Empire, which were part of it before August 1, 1914, the invalidity of the treaties concluded with Soviet Russia, in particular the Brest (Brest) Peace Treaty of 1918; 5) abandon their own colonies; 6) reduce the army and navy, eliminate the General Staff, general military service, destroy fortifications on the borders; 7) pay reparations to the winners; 8) adhere to the principle of most favored nation in economic relations with the allied states, cancel all economic agreements with Russia, Romania, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria; 9) withdraw their troops from the Baltic states.

Reparations (from Latin - restoration) is a type of material responsibility of the aggressor state, which consists in compensation by this state (under a peace treaty or other international acts) for losses caused to the state that was attacked.

The Versailles system found only Germany and her allies guilty of unleashing the First World War.

The conference participants made a decision to prosecute Wilhelm II and persons, "committed actions contrary to the laws and customs of war."

An integral part of the Versailles system was the adoption of the Charter of the League of Nations, which was immediately signed by 44 states. The purpose of the new international organization, according to the Charter, was "the development of cooperation between peoples and the provision of peace and security."

The Treaty of Versailles entered into force in January 1920 after ratification by Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Germany and "officially ended" the First World War. The United States refused to ratify due to its reluctance to recognize the League of Nations, China, Hejaz and Ecuador - due to disagreement with some articles.

Washington Conference 1921-1922

On August 11, 1921, US President J. Harding invited representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Japan and China to Washington to participate in a conference that would consider the issue of disarming the naval forces, solve the problems of the Far East and Pacific Leaders agreed to hold such a conference in the US capital, although each had different goals.

In the early 1920s, both territorial and military-political contradictions between groups of countries were clearly defined. Japan, which did not participate in the Paris Conference, sought to achieve certain advantages in the Far East and the Pacific region; The United States, which refused to participate in the work in the League of Nations, had the goal of politically consolidating its leadership in the world and once again reminding the Entente countries of their debts (Great Britain - $ 4.7 billion, France - 3.8 billion, Italy - 1 , 9 billion, Belgium - about $ 0.5 billion, and the like). The US also tried to force Britain to cut its navy; Great Britain and the United States had claims against France regarding its plans for the development of the navy and the refusal to reduce their ground forces; seeking revenge for the defeat in Paris and Italy. Russia was not invited to the conference again. On the other hand, a delegation of the puppet Far Eastern Republic departed for Washington, which, however, unofficially, was headed by a representative of the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Yazykov. Germany was also not invited to Washington.

Within the framework of the Washington Conference (November 12, 1921 - February 6, 1922), three large-scale treaties were signed and several bilateral agreements were reached. The first was the Pacific Ocean Treaty of the Four Powers (December 13, 1921), which was set for 10 years. According to his terms, the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902-1921) on the division of spheres of influence in the Pacific between these two countries was canceled. The United States, Great Britain, Japan and France assumed mutual obligations to respect the rights of the parties regarding their island possessions in the Pacific Ocean zone and to take joint action in the event of a threat to this possession from a third state. By additional protocols to the treaty, similar guarantees were provided to the Netherlands and Portugal regarding their possessions in this region.

The Treaty of Nine Powers (USA, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal and China), concluded on February 6, 1922, proclaimed the principle of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and administrative inviolability of China, provided equal opportunities for the participating countries in trade and participation in industrial development throughout China to France regarding her plans for the development of the navy and the refusal to reduce her land forces; seeking revenge for the defeat in Paris and Italy. Russia was not invited to the conference again. On the other hand, a delegation of the puppet Far Eastern Republic departed for Washington, which, however, unofficially, was headed by a representative of the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Yazykov. Germany was also not invited to Washington.

Within the framework of the Washington Conference (November 12, 1921 - February 6, 1922), three large-scale treaties were signed and several bilateral agreements were reached. The first was the Pacific Ocean Treaty of the Four Powers (December 13, 1921), which was set for 10 years. According to his terms, the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902-1921) on the division of spheres of influence in the Pacific between the two countries was canceled. The United States, Great Britain, Japan and France assumed mutual obligations to respect the rights of the parties regarding their island possessions in the Pacific Ocean zone and to take joint action in the event of a threat to this possession from a third state. By additional protocols to the treaty, similar guarantees were provided to the Netherlands and Portugal regarding their possessions in this region.

The Nine Power Treaty (USA, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China), concluded on February 6, 1922, proclaimed the principle of respect for China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and administrative immunity. True, the Japanese delegation did not agree to these conditions for a long time, insisting on Japan's "special interests" in China and refusing to withdraw Japanese troops from Shan Dun province, southern Manchuria and other Chinese territories.

On February 6, 1922, an agreement was signed by five powers (USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy) on the limitation of the naval armed forces, in particular on the establishment of the maximum tonnage of the linear fleet and the number of battleships according to the following scheme: 5: 5: 3: 1, 75: 1.75. The states that signed the treaty were forbidden to build and buy ships of this type in other countries with a displacement of more than 35 thousand tons and install guns with a caliber of more than 16 inches on them. Ultimately, Great Britain was allowed to have 20 such ships, the USA - 18, Japan, France and Italy - 10 battleships. With regard to ships of a different class (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, etc.), the treaty did not define any restrictions, but their number had to correspond to the needs of battleship protection.

This treaty canceled the principle of the development of the British fleet (2: 1), that is, the right of Great Britain to have a fleet, quantitatively and qualitatively was equal to the fleets of the two states combined. So Great Britain's hegemony over the oceans was done away with forever.

So, the Washington Conference consolidated the dominant role in the world of the United States and was supposed to provide the world, like its predecessor, the Paris Conference, with additional guarantees of preventing a new global conflict. According to the authors of the Versailles-Washington system of treaties, which was formed as a result of these two conferences, it should become an effective tool in the struggle for peace and prosperity of peoples. But that didn't happen.